Matebeleland independence activists (they are that at the moment) and Ndebele freedom fighters (in the sense of advocacy) do not need a political earthquake to get Mthwakazi independence. What they really need is a simple thing. And it can be stated simply.
All they need is mental re-organization.
From that alone all this fuzziness introduced into that struggle by volume and blind activism and fanciful militancy (of the resent past) will and should give way to measured and deliberate actions that are simultaneously incremental and cumulative. That in turn should force proper structural design of the struggle, its processes, messages, and language. This is the maturity stage that struggle now needs to reach in order to advance.
But it would be a mistake to dismiss the activism and 'militancy' of the recent past. Such activism and 'militancy' has made and continues to make a huge contribution to Mthwakazi's struggle in its own way. Struggles are not always planned, neat, linear happenings delivering outcomes to pre-determined models. Admitted, sometimes luck, combined with 'angry' activism, does the trick. South Africa, and even Zimbabwe, are cases in point. That said, one cannot also forget that that phase of activism and 'militancy' was seen by those who introduced it as a rejection of the original independence project that truly put uMthwakazi's agenda on the political map of the world in the late 1990s/early 2000. What we see now is uMthwakazi struggle having come full cycle.
Clearly, the struggle has to pick up from the temporary political interregnum of the recent past. But how?
To fully answer that question, in other words, to fully recover uMthwakazi's independence struggle, uMthwakazi must understand, fully, how the world now operates. Until uMthwakazi does that, there is little point in even starting. In brief, here is how the new post-Cold War world operates.
This new world, of globalization, human rights, democracy, neo-liberalism even, does not say there are no pressing political issues of internal political oppression and domination and ethnic cleansing or tribal domination in the world in countries such as Zimbabwe. This new world simply rejects violence, incitement to tribal hatred (however wronged you are or feel), militarism, etc as a means for resolving those issues. It has taken meticulous work to keep the world in its present state of relative peace and no big powers, on whom the responsibility to re-order the world inevitably falls, want this order disrupted. In exchange for the world renouncing violence and war, this new world has created political processes and mechanisms through which such pressing political issues, such as Mthwakazi's independence, can now be addressed.
In short, the old absolute sovereignty of States simply no longer exists despite its almost rowdy assertion by States such as Zimbabwe and others engaged in the political and tribal domination of other ethnic groups. The new buzzword in own is 'sovereignty as responsibility', not absolute right. From this radically modified conception of sovereignty has emerged the new Right to Protect principle, often expressed as R2P. All States, not least Zimbabwe, are fully aware of the consequences of colliding with this principle. It is certainly unlikely that Viktor Yanukovich, the now ousted president of Ukraine, will ever wish to collide with R2P again, even if he gets another chance. No small State ever will.
This is welcome.
It is therefore clear that in relation to the independence of Mthwakazi, when eventually it becomes a proper struggle, Zimbabwe will have to behave itself, and will behave itself. For now, for Mthwakazi, the real challenge is to thaw away Gukurahundi that has frozen into their heads and make the new mental leap to the world of today. The fossil of Gukurahundi that is frozen in Mthwaki's heads continues to misinform and mis-structure uMthwakazi's political struggle, through melting anger, pain, victim mode and the burning desire to 'come even', thus completely blinding many Mthwakazians to the reality that uMthwakazi freedom itself and on its own will be all these things put together, even better. So the overarching responsibility of Mthwakazians now should not just be to get uMthwakazi independence but must also be about removing all obstacles that make it difficult or impossible for the world to endorse uMthwakazi independence.
Bear in mind sovereignty is responsibility (uMthwakazi independence means sovereignty)!
It is surprising how many Mthwakazians waste valuable time explaining to the international community what Matebeleland or Mthwakazi is. But mention Zimbabwe to any stranger anywhere in the world, they know about the Ndebele and Gukurahundi (they may not remember the word 'Gukurahundi' but they know about that pogrom). The world fully understands the import of that genocide, yet Mthwakazians continue to elevate Gukurahundi above its true struggle. This is a serious flaw in both the design and process of Mthwakazi struggle. UMthwakazi must therefore first mentally reject Gukurahundi as both a reason or driver (or its framer or shaper) of Mthwakazi independence. At the very most, Gukurahundi must only be a fuel, a constant reminder of the cost of carelessness and recklessness in handling matters of nationhood or people-hood. But nothing must or should replace or displace the deliberateness introduced by framing and fighting this cause as Mthwakazi independence, not as an adjunct or by-product of Gukurahundi.
What should uMthwakazi do?
It is important to underline the fact that the following suggestions cannot be comprehensive or exhaustive, but it has to be hoped that they illustrate the depth and breadth of thinking that has to go into the whole Mthwakazi independence project if it is to pick up the struggle from where it is presently lying.
First, and naturally, uMthwakazi needed to engage the Zimbabwe government, however detestable and arrogant that government is, with regard to peacefully resolving the issue of Mthwakazi independence. It is fair to say, within the particular circumstances that the Ndebele or uMthwakazi find themselves under Zimbabwe rule, uMthwakazi has done all she can and there is nothing further that uMthwakazi can do outside resorting to arms.
Second, and crucially, it is clearly now time for Mthwakazi to go outside the political framework (note, not constitutional framework) of Zimbabwe. Here, uMthwakazi needs no precedent, if there is none. If need be, uMthwakazi needs to be its own precedent. The new world spoken of above has no one-size fits all model; each situation has its own nuances. All the new world does is provide a political framework to all nations and peoples to use. While that framework is not perfect, it is workable and adaptable.
Outside the political framework of Zimbabwe uMthwakazi or the Ndebele can do broadly two things. Firstly, they can form a symbolic Government-in-Exile. This option is unlikely to curry favour internationally, and therefore can be ignored. Secondly, they can form a strong political movement in exile, say in South Africa which under present circumstances they regard as home. They can then approach the South African government and request to address the South African parliament directly on the question of Mthwakazi independence. This option provides heightened political cover and internationalizes the struggle almost instantaneously. But to utilize this option uMthwakazi will have to be sure and clear about what she wants, whether independence or irredentism? The world does not prescribe or force (at least in theory) how a people want to exercise its independence/freedom.
This point about which outcome uMthwakazi wants cannot be something that uMthwakazi can approach emotionally.
It has to be well-thought out, bearing in mind South Africa has obligations and responsibilities to international law. In other words, it would be counter-productive to ask South Africa to do something it would not be able to do under international law or under all or any considerations. The challenge for Mthwakazi is therefore to make their chosen outcome take-able.
In this connection, there are some Mthwakazians who now see in the Crimean 'crisis' today a precedent or parallel for uMthwakazi. This view seems erroneous. The Crimean 'crisis' is a precedent for Mthwakazi for exactly the opposite reason; namely, that it's one uMthwakazi should not follow, and possibly can't follow. The Crimea 'crisis' is, in the end, just Putin's (Russia) pawn in a game of sorts, but mostly dominated by Putin's (Russia) desire to appear important and relevant in a world in which Russia has virtually become a progressively non-player in world affairs. There are therefore no geostrategic reasons that remain for Russia to speak of. The likely outcome is that Crimea will backfire badly on Russia in the long-term. In short, and to continue with the Crimean example, it would be counter-productive for Mthwakazi to be a pawn in South Africa's hand by which South Africa 'creates' a puppet Mthwakazi organization which it then 'receives' in its Parliament to request South African intervention on their behalf in what is today Zimbabwe. That would kill uMthwakazi's independence dead. Thankfully, a responsible government like that of South Africa would not agree to that anyway. Certainly, the world is not buying into Russia's deception in Crimea. Russia's misadventure in Crimea stands robustly rebutted by the world.
If uMthwakazi chooses irredentism, then she has to completely eschew Crimea, for all the reasons already stated above.
It has therefore to be said that in terms of the way uMthwakazi's struggle has been framed in the period from 2008 to 2013, it is easily ignorable by the world, and has. That is why this version of uMthwakazi struggle has not been able to and could not take the political strike of the 2013 elections. Talking of which, it has to be stated, that the massive rigging, what in new parlance in today's Zimbabwe is called 'Nikuving', was a deliberate pre-emptive political strike at Mthwakazi independence, not at MDC-T primarily, as many mistakenly think. And going by present evidence that political strike has largely worked – at least in terms of draining uMthwakazi independence agenda of energy and enthusiasm. However, in a positive and beneficial way, the Nikuving of the 2013 elections, especially the Matebeleland vote, is re-embedding what had become a structure-less, vocal crusade back onto its original structural fulcrum. That is a positive now to be fully exploited as uMthwakazi regroups.
Critically, the Nikuving of the 2013 elections, especially the Mthwakazi vote, has put paid to the fantasy of devolution in the context of Zimbabwe, and has left many Mthwakazians of the 'moderate' and 'polished' type in private mourning but serious political introspection. UMthwakazi's political situation in Zimbabwe, and the way the Zimbabwe State is structured, simply admits of no middle ground without selling it out. And this is no radical position, it is simply a factual reality.
And while on the Mthwakazi independence issue, we may bring in Bulawayo magistrate Chrispen Mberewere' to hammer the political point home. Mr Mberewe's foray into politics in what is supposed to be judicial proceedings illustrates the depth of the problem uMthwakazi has on its hands. Sentencing two Mthwakazi youth leaders, Mqondisi Moyo and Busani Sibindi for organising a demonstration without police clearance, Mr Mberewere is said to have said Matebeleland is not 'marginalized': "It is not true that they come from a marginalised region. The aspect of de-industrialisation affects the whole country." (http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-local-byo-44190.html)
In an article like this one, one doesn't really need to challenge Mr Mberewere's assertion, but instead make three critical political points. First, that Mr Mberewere, just like others like him in other arms of the Zimbabwe State, is just part of the structure of oppression and domination of the Ndebele by the Shona. Second, that he is expected to say and do, as he said and did, what he has said and done. Third, that he is both an occupier and an occupier's functionary over uMthwakazi. And there is nothing new or clever here about him and his masters, uMthwakazi already saw this with White rule and domination. In all probability, in addition to Mr Mberewere as presiding officer himself, the prosecutor who prosecuted and the police who arrested/investigated the case were all Shona. In today's Zimbabwe this counts for and means everything. And the case at issue over which Mr Mberewe and his political platoon descended, politically indicts the Zimbabwe State totally. Fourthly, that Mr Mberewere should feel this freedom to leave the restrictions of the bench and dabble in the plateau of politics (recall it's supposed to be judicial proceedings) betrays his political instrumentality in the grand scheme of today's Zimbabwe State over uMthwakazi.
But that Mr Mberewere thinks he can tell uMthwakazi or the Ndebele what they feel, think or are, would be revolting in more politically refined contexts but it doesn't in the context of today's Zimbabwe - it can only reflect the sickening levels of tribal triumphalism compressed and wringed into the very heart of the Zimbabwe State.
And what is the significance of the Mberewere example in the present context?
Simply, it is that he, like all functionaries and instrumentalities of this occupying victor over Mthwakazi, are just symptoms or manifestations of the system of tribal domination and occupation. However, Mr Mbewere and those like him are not insignificant; they are critical because they operationalize that system. But to see them (as themselves), and see Gukurahundi (as manifestation of power), as uMthwakazians seem to while uMthwakazi builds and structures herself for the new political struggle, is a mistake. The Mbereweres are the faces of the system's fear presenting itself as power, while Gukurahundi, in essence, remains an instrument of betrayal and an instrument of weakness. Neither speak to valour, true power or honour! Therefore uMthwakazi's political struggle cannot be predicated from them.
Tying this to Mthwakazi's irredentism, if uMthwakazi chooses that option, in this new world, and in building uMthwakazi's case inside South Africa's parliament and in international fora at large, these Mberewere examples are the sort of cases/instances that now matter. Readers will recall then Secretary of State Collin Powel's 'performance' way back in 2001 when building the UN's case against Saddam Hussein in the UN General Assembly? Already, we are increasingly beginning to see Russia make these sorts of 'performances' over tables as it tries to sanitize its aggression in Crimea in political forums. By and large the new world does not exclude anyone from its precepts. For now at least, the new world in which uMthwakazi now has to fight its political fight, is evidence-based, rules-driven, and shift-able by political persuasion (as opposed even to political militarism).
The Mbereweres of Mthwakazi's world of today are therefore useful, but the political premium they offer uMthwakazi will be lost unless, first, uMthwakazi regroups and reconfigures its political struggle properly, and pretty soon, and, second, unless uMthwakazi fully explores the prospects offered by irredentism, if not as an end in itself then at least as a means to an end. There is no known rule, custom or other principle stopping or preventing a people oppressed by one State seeking political audience with and protection by another parliament in which such a people believes it can get help.
Perhaps it's time for uMthwakazi to serious explore irredentism. Here – on irredentism - there is a useful parallel with Crimea for Mthwakazi which uMthwakazi can and should exploit, and it is simply that the Crimean situation has been framed and operationalized as irredentism, however utrue or false in the case of Crimea. Needless to say, the point of divergence though between Crimea and uMthwakazi is that the Crimean irredentism is choreographed whereas uMthwakazi's will not and could never be.
UMthwakazi's irredentism will always be real and clearly deliverable!
Aliqunywe Mthwakazi....
